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I. INTRODUCTION 
In June 2009, the United States Department of the Treasury is-
sued its white paper report, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Founda-
tion (“Report”).
1
  The Report contains the Obama Administration’s 
proposed regulatory response to the economic downturn that began 
in 2008.
2
  Notably, the drafters of the Report characterized the eco-
nomic downturn as the “most severe financial crisis since the Great 
Depression.”
3
  The severity of the economic downturn has led some 
commentators to refer to the financial crisis as the “Great Reces-
sion.”
4
  Other commentators have gone so far as to term the econom-
ic downturn as a “depression” itself because of the depth of the down-
turn, the radicalism of the government’s response, and the general 
sense of crisis.
5
  Even though the economy in the United States has 
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 1 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/ 
FinalReport_web.pdf. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. at 2. 
 4 But see Catherine Rampell, ‘Great Recession’: A Brief Etymology, ECONOMIX 
(Mar. 11, 2009, 5:39 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/great-
recession-a-brief-etymology (“Nobody can take credit for coining the term ‘The Great 
Recession’ . . . . Why? . . . Every recession of the last several decades has, at some 
point or another, received this special designation . . . .”). 
 5 See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE 
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION x (2009) (“It is the gravity of the economic downturn, the 
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somewhat rebounded, these indicators of a depression have arguably 
still been met because of the initial sharp economic decline, the fed-
eral government’s unprecedented bailout of the financial services in-
dustry, and the panic that the financial crisis has created.
6
 
In the shadow of the financial downturn that began in 2008, the 
Report details the Obama Administration’s five main policy objectives 
for preventing a future crisis: 
• Promote Robust Supervision and Regulation of Financial 
Firms 
• Establish Comprehensive Regulation of Financial Markets 
• Protect Consumers and Investors from Financial Abuse 
• Provide the Government with the Tools it Needs to Man-
age Financial Crises 
• Raise International Regulatory Standards and Improve In-
ternational Cooperation
7
 
The stated goal that underlies these policy objectives is to “build a 
new foundation for financial regulation and supervision that is simp-
ler and more effectively enforced, that protects consumers and inves-
tors, that rewards innovation and that is able to adapt and evolve with 
changes in the financial market.”
8
  The drafters of the Report suggest 
broad and sweeping financial regulatory reform because of the nu-
merous causes of the financial crisis.
9
 
In regard to raising international regulatory standards and im-
proving international cooperation, the drafters of the Report state 
the following: 
As we have witnessed during this crisis, financial stress can spread 
easily and quickly across national boundaries.  Yet, regulation is 
still set largely in a national context.  Without consistent supervi-
sion and regulation, financial institutions will tend to move their 
activities to jurisdictions with looser standards, creating a race to 
the bottom and intensifying systemic risk for the entire global fi-
nancial system.
10
 
 
radicalism of the government’s responses, and the pervading sense of crisis that mark 
what the economy is going through as a depression.”). 
 6 Id. 
 7 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 1, at 1. 
 8 Id. at 2. 
 9 See infra Part II.B (discussing the causes of the financial crisis that began in 
2008). 
 10 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 1, at 80. 
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Put another way, patchwork regulation does not work to regulate the 
emerging global financial markets
11
 because it generates a race-to-the-
bottom in which nations ratchet down their systems of regulation and 
enforcement to suboptimal levels in an attempt to gain a competitive 
advantage over other nations.
12
 
 Through the Report, the Obama Administration proposes the 
following international regulatory reforms: 
• Strengthen the International Capital Framework 
• Improve the Oversight of Global Financial Markets 
• Enhance Supervision of Internationally Active Financial 
Firms 
• Reform Crisis Prevention and Management Authorities 
and Procedures 
• Strengthen the Financial Stability Board 
• Strengthen Prudential Regulations 
• Expand the Scope of Regulation 
• Introduce Better Compensation Practices 
• Promote Stronger Standards in the Prudential Regulation, 
Money Laundering/Terrorist Financing, and Tax Infor-
mation Exchange Areas 
• Improve Accounting Standards 
• Tighten Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies13 
Despite this lengthy and ambitious list, the specific proposals in the 
Report do little to remedy the problems created by fragmented regu-
lation of the emerging global financial markets, even after the draf-
ters of the Report expressly recognized the problems that regulatory 
fragmentation creates.
14
 
Of major concern is the lack of a concrete proposal for working 
toward the harmonization and centralization of international securi-
ties law.  The goals relating to international reform chiefly focus on 
 
 11 See infra Part II.A (describing the transition from national capital markets to 
global capital markets). 
 12 See Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities 
Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 883, 946–47 (2009) (“The absence of a single inter-
national securities law regulator creates the potential for a classic regulatory race to 
the bottom.  Race to the bottom theorists assume that regulatory competition and 
the lack of a single mandatory framework will encourage managers to incorporate in 
jurisdictions that have the least demanding regulatory structure.”). 
 13 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 1, at 80–88. 
 14 Id. at 80 (“As we have witnessed during this crisis, financial stress can spread 
easily and quickly across national boundaries.  Yet, regulation is still set largely in a 
national context.  Without consistent supervision and regulation, financial institu-
tions will tend to move their activities to jurisdictions with looser standards, creating 
a race to the bottom and intensifying systemic risk for the entire global financial sys-
tem.”). 
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the regulation of financial firms,
15
 despite the fact that mortgage-
backed securities were at the heart of the financial crisis.
16
  The Re-
port declares that “the United States must continue to work with our 
international counterparts to raise international standards for OTC 
[(Over-the-Counter)] derivatives markets, further integrate our fi-
nancial market infrastructures, and avoid measures that may result in 
market fragmentation.”
17
  But the Report fails to provide concrete 
proposals as to how such harmonization can be achieved.  In fact, the 
only specific securities regulation reform that the drafters of the Re-
port propose is the tightening of oversight on the credit rating agen-
cies that rated the mortgage-backed securities, which gave birth to 
the financial crisis.
18
  This does little to address the systemic weakness 
and race-to-the-bottom that the regulatory fragmentation of interna-
tional securities law creates. 
This Article advocates for the harmonization and centralization 
of international securities regulation as a means of preventing future 
financial crises.  In other articles, I have discussed the opportunity 
that the financial crisis that began in 2008 presents for reimagining 
international securities regulation,
19
 the need for comprehensive do-
mestic and international regulatory reform to prevent future crises,
20
 
the United States federal government’s role in reimagining interna-
tional securities regulation,
21
 the need for a centralized global securi-
ties regulator,
22
 and the evolutionary method by which a centralized 
 
 15 See id. at 80–88 (containing the Obama Administration’s goals relating to in-
ternational reform in response to the financial crisis that began in 2008); see also su-
pra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 56–62 and accompanying text (describing the role of mortgage-
backed securities in the financial crisis that began in 2008). 
 17 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 1, at 81. 
 18 See id. at 87 (stating that the Obama Administration via the United States De-
partment of the Treasury “urge[s] national authorities to enhance their regulatory 
regimes to effectively oversee credit rating agencies (CRAs), consistent with interna-
tional standards and the G-20 Leaders’ recommendations”). 
 19 See Eric C. Chaffee, A Moment of Opportunity: Reimagining International Securities 
Regulation in the Shadow of Financial Crisis, 15 NEXUS 29 (2010). 
 20 See Eric C. Chaffee, A Panoramic View of the Financial Crisis that Began in 2008: 
The Need for Domestic and International Regulatory Reform, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 21 See Eric C. Chaffee, The Internationalization of Securities Regulation: The United 
States Government’s Role in Regulating the Global Capital Markets, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 187 
(2010). 
 22 See Eric C. Chaffee, Evolution, Not Revolution, in International Securities Regulation: 
A Modest Proposal for a Global Securities and Exchange Commission (forthcoming). 
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global securities regulator might emerge.
23
  This Article adds to the 
existing scholarship in three main ways.  First, it provides an in-depth 
discussion of the arguments for harmonization and centralization of 
international securities regulation—including that harmonization 
and centralization will help minimize risk in the emerging capital 
markets,
24
 increase market efficiency,
25
 and pool the expertise and 
experience of the world’s securities regulators.
26
  Second, this Article 
provides an in-depth discussion of the arguments against harmoniza-
tion and centralization—including that harmonization and centrali-
zation do not yield the same benefits as regulatory competition,
27
 
cannot be implemented in the current international regulatory envi-
ronment,
28
 and would result in a loss of autonomy for the United 
States.
29
  Third, this Article concludes that harmonization and centra-
lization offer the best path forward in international securities regula-
tion and discusses the evolutionary process through which a harmo-
nized and centralized system might emerge. 
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows.  Part II of 
this Article examines the emerging global capital markets and the 
need to reform international securities regulation.  Part III provides 
various arguments in favor of the harmonization and centralization of 
 
 23 See Eric C. Chaffee, Contemplating the Endgame: An Evolutionary Model for the 
Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities Regulation, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2010). 
 24 See infra Part III.A (discussing why the harmonization and centralization of in-
ternational securities law will help to minimize risk in the emerging global capital 
markets, including that such an approach will end the international race-to-the-
bottom in securities regulation, create a seamless system of regulation that reduces 
regulatory and enforcement gaps, and reduce spillover risks from regional or nation-
al financial crises). 
 25 See infra Part III.B (discussing why the harmonization and centralization of in-
ternational securities law increases market efficiency, including that such an ap-
proach reduces transaction costs, removes barriers to efficiency, and increases inves-
tor confidence). 
 26 See infra Part III.C (discussing why harmonization and centralization of inter-
national securities law is beneficial because it pools the expertise and experience of 
the world’s securities regulators). 
 27 See infra notes 176–181 and accompanying text (responding to criticisms that 
the harmonization and centralization of international securities law would prevent 
the benefits of regulatory competition). 
 28 See infra notes 182–190 and accompanying text (responding to criticisms that 
the harmonization and centralization of international securities law would be imposs-
ible to implement). 
 29 See infra notes 191–192 and accompanying text (responding to criticisms that 
the harmonization and centralization of international securities law would not be in 
the best interests of the United States because it would result in a loss of autonomy 
for the United States). 
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international securities law, and Part IV analyzes various arguments 
against such harmonization and centralization.  In Part V, this Article 
concludes that harmonization and centralization offer the best me-
thod of regulating the emerging global capital markets, and although 
such harmonization and centralization is unrealistic in the short-
term, the United States and other nations should begin the slow evo-
lutionary process toward a harmonized and centralized system of in-
ternational securities law. 
II. THE EMERGING GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND THE NEED TO 
REFORM INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION 
The world’s capital markets are transitioning from being nation-
al or regional in nature to being global.
30
  This transition creates new 
challenges in terms of international securities law because securities 
regulation remains fragmented between regulators in individual na-
tions or regions.
31
  As discussed in the previous section, patchwork 
regulation will not work to effectively regulate the emerging global 
markets.
32
  This section explores the reasons for the transition from 
national and regional capital markets to global markets, how this 
transition contributed to the financial crisis that began in 2008, and 
the various models that might be used to regulate the emerging glob-
al markets. 
A. The Transition to Global Capital Markets 
In recent years, the world’s capital markets have experienced a 
dramatic transformation as they have shifted from being national or 
regional in nature to being global.  For much of the twentieth cen-
tury, many viewed the United States as having the world’s premier 
 
 30 See Susan Wolburgh Jenah, Commentary on A Blueprint from Cross-Border 
Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 69, 69–
70 (2007) (“Globalization is a fact.  Innovative technologies are driving faster and 
more efficient trading, and they do not recognize national borders.  Capital market 
participants are expanding their business activities into foreign markets.  Investors 
are seeking international investment opportunities. The impact of these changes is 
profound and not yet fully realized.”); Roberta S. Karmel, The Case for a European Se-
curities Commission, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 9, 31 (1999) (“[S]ecurities trading has 
become globalized and stock exchanges conduct business in a manner that tran-
scends national boundaries.”). 
 31 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting that financial regulation is 
still determined by national regulators, despite the fact that financial distress can 
now spread easily and quickly across national borders). 
 32 See supra notes 10–12 (arguing that patchwork regulation of the emerging 
global capital markets creates global systemic risk and a race-to-the-bottom in terms 
of international securities regulation). 
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capital markets and premier system of securities regulation.
33
  From 
this dominant position, the United States was able to export its theo-
ries of securities regulation and enforcement to other nations and 
regions.
34
  During this period, the United States also served as a coor-
dinating force in international securities law because its dominant 
position allowed it to influence other nations’ and regions’ capital 
markets and systems of securities regulation.
35
  During the twenty-first 
century, however, the dominance of the United States has been wan-
ing as global capital markets have begun to emerge.
36
  The United 
States’ ability to be a coordinating force in international securities law 
has also begun to weaken because it no longer acts from a position of 
dominance.
37
  The emergence of global capital markets has occurred 
 
 33 See Robert G. DeLaMater, Recent Trends in SEC Regulation of Foreign Issuers: How 
the U.S. Regulatory Regime is Affecting the United States’ Historic Position as the World’s Prin-
cipal Capital Market, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 109, 109 (2006) (“Since World War II, the 
United States has been the world’s principal capital market.  This market has been 
uniquely broad and deep, with substantial retail participation by individual investors 
and small institutions, plentiful capital for equity financing and a willingness to hold 
long-term debt securities . . . .”); Howell E. Jackson, A System of Selective Substitute Com-
pliance, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 105, 119 (2007) (“For much of the twentieth century, the 
[SEC] justly considered itself to be the world’s premier securities market regula-
tor.”). 
 34 See George W. Madison & Stewart P. Greene, TIAA-CREF Response to A Blue-
print for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 99, 100 (2007) (“The SEC performs it task admirably—and sets the 
standard against which all other regulators around the globe are judged. . . . The 
SEC, with its track record and high standards for protecting investors, has historically 
been a leader in setting benchmarks for market regulation.”). 
 35 Id. 
 36 See Edward F. Greene, Beyond Borders: Time to Tear Down the Barriers to Global In-
vesting, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 85, 85 (2007) (“There can be no argument that the securi-
ties markets are now global and the dominance of the United States as the leading 
player in the global marketplace is being challenged.”); Jackson, supra note 33, at 119 
(“[T]he capital markets of many other countries have developed and the supervisory 
capabilities of many jurisdictions have expanded—often with the assistance of advice 
from the SEC or the International Organization of Securities Commissions.  Today, a 
number of these jurisdictions provide capital market oversight that is substantially 
equivalent to SEC supervision.”). 
 37 See DeLaMater, supra note 33, at 116 (“[T]he U.S. model is not as well re-
garded as it was a few years ago, it is no longer the gold standard to which other reg-
ulatory schemes could only aspire.  The U.S. model has been tarnished by the scan-
dals of 2001 and 2002, as all of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia and the other 
companies so prominent among the scandals were obviously SEC-registered, listed 
on U.S. stock exchanges, and audited under U.S. generally accepted auditing stan-
dards.”); Greene, supra note 36, at 85 (“The SEC can no longer afford to sit on the 
sidelines and pretend that the U.S. market is the only game in town.  It must ac-
knowledge that other securities markets and regulators have matured to the point 
where they rival (and some might argue exceed) the United States in sophistica-
tion.”); Roberta S. Karmel, The EU Challenge to the SEC, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1692, 
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for a variety of reasons, including the evolution of securities trading, 
the rise of other strong new securities markets, and the aggressive 
regulation of the capital markets in the United States. 
The transition from national or regional capital markets to glob-
al capital markets has been fueled in large part by the evolution of se-
curities trading.  Technology now affords investors with nearly limit-
less investment opportunities around the globe.
38
  Although foreign 
issuers and other sellers may be prohibited from directly soliciting in-
vestors within the borders of some nations,
39
 both retail and institu-
tional investors are free to seek out opportunities abroad and to pur-
chase securities on foreign exchanges.
40
  In the United States, both 
retail and institutional investors seek out foreign investment oppor-
tunities as a means of portfolio diversification and to take advantage 
of fluctuations in currency exchange rates.
41
  Indeed, foreign invest-
 
1711 (2008) (“Since the SEC has served as the gold standard of securities regulation, 
it is not surprising that as the EU has striven to improve and integrate European cap-
ital markets, it has looked to U.S. securities regulation as a model.  Yet, changing 
economics, and in particular the migration of many international issuers to the Lon-
don markets, has given the EU more power in influencing the SEC.”); see also Eric J. 
Pan, Single Stock Futures and Cross-Border Access for U.S. Investors, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
FIN. 221, 228 (2008) (“The capacity of investors and issuers to purchase and sell se-
curities in markets outside of the United States challenges the SEC’s ability to ensure 
that the raising of capital from U.S. investors is subject to SEC approved standards of 
investor protection and market integrity.”). 
 38 See Greene, supra note 36, at 86 (“The rise of the internet has given investors a 
new window on the world and access to almost limitless information.  A natural out-
growth of this technological revolution, coupled with increasing investor sophistica-
tion and the need for financial diversification that transcends home country borders, 
is the understandable desire of investors to communicate and effect transactions di-
rectly with market participants located in other jurisdictions.”). 
 39 See Jackson, supra note 33, at 111 (“U.S. retail investors face serious problems 
receiving information about foreign investment opportunities.  Most notably, foreign 
broker dealers are prohibited from soliciting most U.S. retail investors unless those 
firms comply with SEC registration and compliance requirements.”); Eric J. Pan, A 
European Solution to the Regulation of Cross-Border Markets, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. 
L. 133, 157 (2007) (“[T]he SEC has prevented foreign exchanges from offering ser-
vices directly to U.S. investors without registering as a U.S. exchange.”). 
 40 See Jackson, supra note 33, at 108 (“Increasingly[,] major institutional investors 
have established offices overseas in key financial centers, like London and Tokyo, 
and prefer to trade their foreign securities in the home market of issuers . . . . Institu-
tions that lack foreign offices also prefer off-shore trading venues for foreign securi-
ties and can effect trading on these markets through relationships with foreign bro-
kers . . . .”). 
 41 See Greene, supra note 36, at 85–86 (“Investing in non-U.S. markets is no long-
er the exclusive province of megainstutions or the ultrawealthy; it is an essential 
component of prudent portfolio diversification for all investors.”). 
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ment by both retail and institutional investors in the United States 
has increased dramatically within the past few years.
42
 
The evolution of securities trading has also fueled the emer-
gence of global capital markets because securities exchanges have 
begun to evolve into transnational entities.  The recent wave of secur-
ities exchange demutualization has transformed securities exchanges 
into for-profit entities that are willing to eschew previous nationalistic 
and protectionist tendencies in favor of seeking out new profit-
making opportunities regardless of whether they are foreign or do-
mestic.
43
  This wave of securities exchange demutualization has 
touched off a wave of securities exchange consolidation.
44
  When the 
merger between the New York Stock Exchange and Euronext was 
completed on April 4, 2007, the world saw the birth of the first trans-
national securities exchange.
45
  The ensuing push for the consolida-
tion of other exchanges continues to break down national barriers 
and to aid in the emergence of a global capital market.
46
 
 
 42 See Karmel, supra note 37, at 1711 (“U.S. investors are buying foreign securities 
in record numbers and foreign issuers no longer believe they need to make offerings 
in the U.S. to raise capital.”); see also Pan, supra note 37, at 229 (“U.S. investors have 
become mobile because of new ways for them to be exposed to foreign securities and 
their changing preferences in favor of foreign securities.”). 
 43 See Jenah, supra note 30, at 71 (arguing that the demutualization of many se-
curities exchanges has “unleashed pressure from shareholders to increase profits 
through expansion, investment in new technology, and cost cutting, forcing these 
for-profit entities to eschew nationalistic or protectionist tendencies in the bid for 
value maximization”); Roberta S. Karmel, The Once and Future New York Stock Ex-
change: The Regulation of Global Exchanges, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 355, 356 
(2007) (“Another factor in the inevitable globalization of exchanges is that the ex-
changes have demutualized and become public companies.  They need to please 
their shareholders as well as their customers.”). 
 44 See Pan, supra note 39, at 136 (“Demutualization and increased competition 
has led to a wave of consolidation by the European exchanges.”). 
 45 See generally Bo Harvey, Note, Exchange Consolidation and Models of International 
Securities Regulation, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 151 (2007) (discussing the evolution 
of international securities law in the wake of the New York Stock Exchange and Eu-
ronext merger); Sara M. Saylor, Note, Are Securities Regulators Prepared for a Truly 
Transnational Exchange, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 685 (2008) (discussing the New York 
Stock Exchange and Euronext merger and the resulting need to reimagine interna-
tional securities regulation).  But see Pan, supra note 37, at 232 (“While the NYSE and 
Euronext can enjoy the savings of reduced overhead and shared trading technology 
and systems, the main benefit of the merger will be achieved only when investors and 
issuers are granted full access to all markets operated by the combined entity.”). 
 46 See Jenah, supra note 30, at 71 (“[The] chess game of proposed exchange mer-
gers, capital tie-ups, and alliances being played out on the global stage bears witness 
to the truism that capital markets are global.”); see also Karmel, supra note 37, at 1711 
(“The merger of the NYSE and Euronext probably was a wakeup call to both the SEC 
and the EU signaling the need for convergence of their regulatory systems, increased 
cooperation among regulators, and a new approach to mutual recognition.”). 
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The world’s capital markets are also transitioning from being na-
tional and regional in nature to being global because capital markets 
outside of the United States have grown in both size and sophistica-
tion.  Despite the dominance of the United States during much of 
the twentieth century, the United States now competes with strong 
markets in Asia, Europe, and South America to attract issuers, inves-
tors, and other market participants.
47
  The capital markets in the Eu-
ropean Union have grown in both breadth and depth,
48
 and the rise 
of strong markets in Brazil, Russia, India, and China, which are often 
referred to as the “BRIC” nations, demonstrates that focus has begun 
to shift away from the markets in the United States.
49
  The result has 
been that issuers, investors, and other market participants look for 
opportunities globally, rather than on a national or regional basis. 
The United States also fueled the emergence of global capital 
markets by pursuing aggressive regulation of its own national capital 
markets.  For example, the United States experienced a significant 
drop in initial public offerings by foreign issuers as a result of the pas-
sage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
50
 which placed extensive new 
corporate governance requirements on entities wishing to issue stock 
in the United States.
51
  In addition, many commentators argue that 
 
 47 See DeLaMater, supra note 33, at 117 (“The securities markets outside the 
United States have grown in breadth and depth of their own over the past twenty 
years and now afford issuers in their home countries significant opportunities for fi-
nancing that did not previously exist.”); Donald C. Langevoort, U.S. Securities Regula-
tion and Global Competition, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 191, 194–95 (2008) (“[C]ompetition 
has eroded the United States’ once massive advantage for reasons unrelated to regu-
lation except for the increasing quality of what other countries are doing.  As global 
markets improve, U.S. investors, both institutional and retail, have expanded their 
geographic reach so as to be almost as willing and able to trade in those markets as in 
New York.”). 
 48 See Karmel, supra note 43, at 363 (“Marketplace developments in recent years 
also made a U.S. listing less attractive for foreign issuers.  The European markets 
have matured to a point where capital can be raised there to meet the needs of most 
companies.  Foreign, and even some U.S. companies, engaging in IPOs or stock ex-
change listings have done so in Europe, rather than in the United States.”). 
 49 See Karmel, supra note 37, at 1711–12 (“The new strong capital markets in 
Asia and South America, and in particular in the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China), challenge both the EU and the SEC to shape their regula-
tory approaches to foreign issuers and foreign financial institutions so as not to lose 
their competitive places as market regulators.”). 
 50 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 7201–7266 (2006)). 
 51 See Karmel, supra note 43, at 356–57 (“[T]he primary reasons why the NYSE 
has been losing listings are that foreign issuers are disenchanted with the U.S. stock 
market because of the costs of compliance with the requirements of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley) and because of the U.S. culture of shareholder 
litigation.”).  But see Jackson, supra note 33, at 108 (“Although many have pointed to 
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issuers, investors, and other market participants have been driven 
abroad because of the United States’ culture of shareholder litigation 
and history of aggressive enforcement by the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), which create expenses for issu-
ers that are ultimately passed on to the holders of their securities.
52
 
B. International Securities Law and the Great Recession 
As discussed in the introduction of this Article, the financial cri-
sis that began in 2008, which some have termed the “Great Reces-
sion,” resulted in part from a race-to-the-bottom in international se-
curities law.
53
  The causes of the financial crisis are complex and will 
be debated for years to come.  Although a thorough and complete 
analysis of the financial crisis is beyond the scope of this Article, a few 
words ought to be included about how the financial crisis came into 
being and why the current system of international securities law is in 
part to blame.  The origins of the financial crisis are important be-
cause they demonstrate the inherent systemic weakness in the current 
dominant model of international securities regulation. 
To grossly oversimplify, the financial crisis resulted from the de-
valuation of mortgage-backed securities.  In the early years of the 
twenty-first century, lenders began issuing large numbers of high-risk 
mortgages to individuals and other entities that were unlikely to re-
pay.
54
  This created a “bubble” in housing prices.
55
  The high-risk 
mortgages were then pooled together with other assets and sold to 
special purpose entities, which allowed the lenders to quickly realize 
 
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as damaging the ability of U.S. ex-
changes to compete for foreign cross-listings, there is ample evidence that the ero-
sion of U.S. market power for foreign listings was already underway well before 
2002.”). 
 52 See Jenah, supra note 30, at 71 (arguing that “the increased regulatory burden 
in the United States, combined with mounting concerns over exposure to U.S.-style 
class actions and more aggressive enforcement, may be driving companies to raise 
capital in foreign markets”). 
 53 See sources cited supra notes 10–12 (arguing that patchwork regulation of the 
emerging global capital markets will result in a race-to-the-bottom in terms of inter-
national securities law). 
 54 See David Schmudde, Responding to the Subprime Mess: The New Regulatory Land-
scape, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 709, 710–11 (2009) (“As the real estate bubble 
inflated and creative mortgage methods were invented, all proven rules were ig-
nored. . . . Consumers, ignoring basic financial advice, were entering into mortgages 
they simply could not repay.  Everyone seemed to think that real estate prices would 
rise forever.”). 
 55 Id. 
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a profit and to continue issuing high-risk mortgages.
56
  To pay for the 
pools of high-risk mortgages and other assets, the special purpose 
entities began issuing mortgage-backed securities.
57
  The mortgage-
backed securities were then sold both domestically and abroad, and 
many financial institutions purchased these securities.
58
  When the 
housing “bubble” burst, the default rate on the high-risk mortgages 
rose dramatically,
59
 and the mortgage-backed securities were deva-
lued.
60
  The financial institutions that had purchased the mortgage-
backed securities were no longer willing to extend credit because of 
the uncertainty of the value of the mortgage-backed securities in their 
portfolios.
61
  Because of the lack of available credit, the United States 
economy ground to a halt.
62
  A financial crisis ensued and cascaded 
around the rest of the world.
63
 
Many commentators focus on the housing “bubble” when dis-
cussing the causes of the financial crisis that began in 2008.  Some 
fault the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee for 
keeping interest rates low in the early years of the twenty-first century 
because it made large amounts of credit available, which ultimately 
 
 56 See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1313, 1316 
(2009).   
In the most basic form of mortgage securitization, mortgage-backed se-
curities (MBS) are issued by a special-purpose vehicle (SPV), and pay-
ment on the securities is derived directly from collections on mortgage 
loans owned by the SPV.  More complex forms of mortgage-backed se-
curities include collateralized debt obligation (CDO) securities in 
which payment derives directly from a mixed pool of mortgage loans 
and sometimes, also, from other financial assets owned by the SPV; and 
‘ABS CDO’ securities in which payment derives from MBS and CDO 
securities owned by the SPV. . . . 
Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See generally Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Global Implications of the Securitiza-
tion of U.S. Housing Debt, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77 (2008). 
 59 See Schwarcz, supra note 55, at 1317 (explaining that the mortgage-backed se-
curities were devalued when real estate “bubble” burst and the default rate on the 
underlying mortgages increased dramatically). 
 60 Id. 
 61 See Jerry W. Markham, The Subprime Crisis—Some Thoughts on a “Sustainable” and 
“Organic” Regulatory System, 4 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 381, 393–94 (2009) (explaining 
that as a result of the devaluation of many mortgage-backed securities “[c]redit mar-
kets were frozen and liquidity became absent” because the financial institutions that 
had purchased the mortgage-backed securities were unsure how to assess the mort-
gage-backed securities’ worth). 
 62 Id. 
 63 See id. (explaining that as a result of the credit market being frozen the United 
States economy fell into recession). 
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created a “bubble” in housing prices.
64
  Other commentators fault 
politicians for creating the “bubble” that precipitated the financial 
crisis because of government subsidies for home purchases and be-
cause of government pressure on financial institutions to grant mort-
gages to individuals who were highly unlikely to repay.
65
  Still other 
observers blame the financial crisis on the financial institutions them-
selves and allege that the financial institutions issued high-risk mort-
gages based on both recklessness and greed.
66
  Finally, a few commen-
tators hold no one morally accountable for the financial crisis; 
instead, they blame the crisis on the perceptual failure of the individ-
uals operating within a “bubble” to realize that the “bubble” existed 
and would burst.
67
 
Solely focusing on the causes of the housing “bubble,” however, 
ignores the role played by mortgage-backed securities in the financial 
crisis.  As previously explained, the financial crisis occurred because 
many financial institutions had purchased mortgage-backed securities 
that were devalued when the housing “bubble” burst.
68
  Because many 
financial institutions were no longer sure of how to value the mort-
gage-backed securities in their portfolio, these entities stopped ex-
tending credit, and the United States economy consequentially 
 
 64 See, e.g., Robert T. Miller, Morals in a Market Bubble, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 113, 
136 (2009) (concluding that the financial crisis “began at the Federal Reserve, where 
Alan Greenspan and his colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee made 
some mistakes in the early years of this decade by keeping interest rates very low for a 
very long time”). 
 65 See, e.g., Robert Hardaway, The Great American Housing Bubble: Re-Examining 
Cause and Effect, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV 33, 59 (2009) (arguing that the best way to pre-
vent a future housing “bubble” is by “eliminating home mortgage tax subsidies for 
the richest Americans [and] repealing laws pressuring banks to extend mortgages to 
marginal buyers”). 
 66 See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, Subprime Bailouts and the Predator State, 35 U. DAYTON 
L. REV. 81, 84–85 (2009) (“In what can only be described as an orgy of reckless finan-
cial management, a number of very large financial firms pursued short-term profits 
without regard to risks borne by their firms in one of the greatest credit bubbles in 
history, starting in 2004 and continuing through 2007.  Much of this excessively risky 
credit found its way into the U.S. residential real estate market via subprime loans.”). 
 67 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 64, at 137 (“Moralizing critics blame virtually every-
one involved in the housing market [for the financial crisis that began in 2008], but 
in reality virtually all of these people were entirely innocent.  They were trapped in a 
market bubble, and certainly none of these people, whether individually or even col-
lectively, engaged in any moral wrongdoing that caused the bubble and the burst.”).  
But see Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Disclosure and Judgment: “We Have Met Madoff and He is 
Ours,” 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 139, 144 (2009) (arguing that the financial crisis that be-
gan in 2008 resulted from failures in human judgment, rather than failures of the 
laws and regulations mandating disclosure of information). 
 68 See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text. 
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ground to a halt.
69
  Therefore, in addressing the root causes of the fi-
nancial crisis, one must also consider what went wrong with the 
mortgage-backed securities. 
The issues created by mortgage-backed securities resulted from 
under-regulation of these securities by Congress, and, more specifi-
cally, the SEC.  Remarkably, when more aggressive regulation and en-
forcement was needed, the SEC was taking a “hands off” approach to 
institutional investors, mortgage-backed securities, and the credit rat-
ing agencies that were valuing mortgage-backed securities.
70
  The 
SEC’s “hands off” approach resulted in large part from the deregula-
tionist movement in the United States that gained traction in the ear-
ly years of the twenty-first century.  As Judge Richard Posner, a major 
proponent of deregulation, admits in A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis 
of ‘08 and the Descent into Depression, “[t]he movement to deregulate 
the financial industry went too far by exaggerating the resilience—
the self-healing powers—of laissez-faire capitalism.”
71
  Put simply, the 
financial crisis that began in 2008 can in large part be traced to a de-
regulationist movement that was too successful in advocating for a 
“hands off” approach to securities regulation and enforcement. 
The deregulationist movement gained traction in the early years 
of the twenty-first century because the dominance of the United 
States had been declining in terms of its capital markets and role as a 
securities regulator.
72
  International regulatory competition was 
emerging as the dominant model for international securities regula-
tion,
73
 and a race-to-the-bottom was occurring as regulators ratcheted 
down their levels of regulation and enforcement in hopes of attract-
ing issuers, investors, and other market participants to their jurisdic-
 
 69 See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text (explaining that many financial 
institutions were unwilling to extend credit when the mortgage-backed securities that 
they held were devalued because the financial institutions were unsure how to assess 
the mortgage-backed securities’ worth). 
 70 See Barbara Black, Protecting the Retail Investor in an Age of Financial Uncertainty, 
35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 61, 77 (2009) (arguing that to prevent future financial crises 
the United States must “get rid of the ‘hands off’ attitude toward institutional and 
sophisticated investors that is ingrained into the regulatory climate”). 
 71 See POSNER, supra note 5, at xii. 
 72 See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (explaining that the dominance 
of the United States has been waning in terms of its capital markets and its role as a 
securities regulator). 
 73 See Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1435, 1435–36 (2008) (arguing that the emerging system of international 
securities regulation is based on regulatory competition). 
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tions.
74
  In the early years of the twenty-first century, no regulator 
wanted to increase the level of regulation on mortgage-backed securi-
ties out of fear that it would disadvantage their nation or region from 
participating in the housing “bubble” in the United States.  The re-
sult, of course, was the financial crisis that began in 2008. 
C. Six Possible Models for International Securities Law 
The financial crisis that began in 2008 evidences the systemic 
risk that is created if the world takes a regulatory competition ap-
proach to international securities law.  As the financial crisis demon-
strates, patchwork regulation does not provide an optimal level of 
regulation for the emerging global securities markets.  This reality 
raises the question: What are the available approaches for interna-
tional securities law?  This section discusses six possible models for in-
ternational securities law.  These models are privatization, competi-
tion, convergence, mutual recognition, harmonization, and centrali-
centralization.
75
  These approaches can be placed on a spectrum 
based on the amount of international cooperation and coordination 
that is required to bring each of them into existence and to maintain 
them.  On this spectrum, regulatory privatization would be at one 
endpoint because it requires the least cooperation and coordination 
among securities regulators, and regulatory centralization would be 
at the other endpoint because it requires the most cooperation and 
coordination.  When traveling from regulatory privatization to centra-
lization on this spectrum, one would pass through competition, con-
vergence, mutual recognition, and harmonization.  Obviously, these 
approaches can and do overlap and blur. 
Under a regulatory privatization approach, stock exchanges 
would have the power to develop their own internal systems of securi-
 
 74 See Langevoort, supra note 47, at 193 (“The global scale of the [financial crisis 
that began in 2008] shows that other countries have been too lax as well, so that 
there should be a ratcheting up of securities regulation not only in the United States, 
but worldwide.”). 
 75 In my previous scholarship discussing the possible models for international se-
curities law, I chose to omit regulatory privatization because privatization involves 
regulation by non-governmental entities, rather than among nations.  See Chaffee, 
supra note 19, at 35–39; Chaffee, supra note 21, at 193–97.  After thinking about it 
more, I have opted to include a discussion of regulatory privatization in this Article 
because it adds to the discussion of how the emerging global capital markets might 
best be regulated.  In addition, because of the rise of transnational exchanges, priva-
tization should properly be viewed as a type of international securities law. 
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ties regulation that would govern their exchanges.
76
  Issuers, investors, 
and other market participants would then opt to subject themselves 
to these privatized systems of securities regulation by engaging in 
transactions on a particular exchange.
77
  Although this idea might 
seem novel, the United States used this approach prior to the passage 
of the first blue sky laws in the early 1900s.
78
  Even though regulatory 
privatization was once the law of the land in the United States, reins-
tituting this approach either in the United States or internationally 
would likely be extremely difficult because the world has grown ac-
customed to regulation on a national level by governmental entities.
79
 
A second approach to international securities regulation can be 
founded on regulatory competition.  Under a regulatory competition 
approach, individual nations develop systems of securities regulation 
and compete to attract issuers, investors, and other market partici-
pants.
80
  The world is currently transitioning to a regulatory competi-
tion approach to international securities law.
81
  As previously dis-
cussed, for much of the twentieth century, the United States was 
viewed as having the world’s premier capital markets and premier sys-
tem of securities regulation.
82
  The United States was able to serve as a 
coordinating force in international securities law by exporting its 
theories of market regulation and enforcement to other nations.
83
  As 
 
 76 See generally Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453 
(1997) (arguing that securities exchanges should be the primary source of securities 
regulation). 
 77 Id. 
 78 See Howell E. Jackson, Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in Financial 
Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 649, 661 (2001) (“[A]dvocating the full priva-
tization of securities regulation, would, in the United States, turn back the clock 
nearly a full century, not just before the New Deal, but further back, before the 
dawning of the first Blue Sky laws of the early 1900s.”). 
 79 See id. at 660 (describing privatization as a “radical school of thought” because 
it “challenge[s] the question of whether governments should even play a role in the 
development of securities regimes”). 
 80 See Tzung-bor Wei, The Equivalence Approach to Securities Regulation, 27 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 255, 256 (2007) (“[A]dvocates of regulatory competition assert that 
countries should not restrict themselves to a one-size-fits-all approach.  Different 
countries should be able to enact different laws to accommodate different prefe-
rences and experiences.  The regulatory competition model allows countries to tailor 
their laws to country-specific circumstances.”). 
 81 See Brummer, supra note 73.  
 82 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (explaining that for much of the 
twentieth century the United States was viewed as having the world’s principal capital 
markets and premier system of securities regulation). 
 83 See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text (arguing that because of its do-
minance in terms of its capital markets and system of securities regulation during the 
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the dominance of the United States has begun to diminish, regulato-
ry competition has begun to emerge as the dominant approach to in-
ternational securities law.
84
  Consequently, nations are under-
regulating their securities markets in a race-to-the-bottom to attract 
issuers, investors, and other market participants.
85
 
Regulatory convergence is a third approach to international se-
curities regulation.  Regulatory convergence can be bifurcated into 
both weak and strong forms.  Under a weak regulatory convergence 
approach, nations naturally gravitate toward similar systems of securi-
ties regulation.
86
  If a dominant nation exists that is viewed as having 
the world’s best capital markets and best system of securities law, then 
this may actually lead to a race-to-the-top in which the dominant na-
tion can pick and choose the best practices from other nations and 
construct an optimal system of regulation and enforcement.
87
  Other 
nations will then converge on the dominant nation’s system of securi-
ties regulation.
88
 
Throughout much of the twentieth century, the world took a 
weak regulatory convergence approach to international securities 
regulation.  During this period, other nations viewed the United 
States as having the world’s best capital markets and best system of 
securities regulation.
89
  The United States was able to use its domin-
ance to export its theories of securities regulation, and other nations 
 
twentieth century, the United States was able to influence other nations’ and regions’ 
systems of securities regulation). 
 84 See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (arguing that dominance of the 
United States has begun to wane in terms of its capital markets and role as a securi-
ties regulator). 
 85 But see Wei, supra note 80, at 256 (“[R]egulatory competition fosters innovation 
because countries must compete with each other to attract market participants . . . 
.”). 
 86 See Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, 94 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 478, 495 (2000) (“[The regulatory convergence] approach involves a system 
of structured international activities through which national laws and regulations are 
made more congruent, the enforcement of similar laws is coordinated international-
ly, or both.  This approach may often not include a formal international agreement.  
It relies instead on contact and cooperation between national regulatory officials.”). 
 87 See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental 
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 61 (2002) (“The incen-
tives to converge regulatory policies also vary given the distribution of regulatory 
power.  Concentrated regulatory power can make efforts at harmonization easier, 
because other jurisdictions will often have strong incentives to adopt the dominant 
actor’s model.”). 
 88 Id. 
 89 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (reporting that for much of the twen-
tieth century the United States was viewed as having the world’s premier capital mar-
kets and premier system of securities regulation). 
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were willing to make their securities laws converge with those of the 
Unites States.
90
  Although the United States continues to try to export 
its theories of securities via the SEC,
91
 the dominance of the United 
States has begun to wane, and regulatory competition has become 
the dominant model of international securities law.
92
 
Under a strong regulatory convergence model of international 
securities law, nations agree to certain regulatory norms through 
treaties or other agreements.
93
  Nations then adopt codes of securities 
regulation based on these regulatory norms, and these norms cause 
the individual nations to converge upon similar systems of securities 
regulation.
94
  Although strong regulatory convergence has never been 
the dominant model for international securities law, in certain in-
stances, nations have entered multilateral memorandums of under-
standing and other agreements that require the signatories to comply 
with certain basic regulatory norms in regard to their systems of se-
curities regulation and enforcement.
95
 
A fourth approach to international securities law is founded on 
regulatory mutual recognition.  Under a regulatory mutual recogni-
tion approach, nations enter into treaties or other agreements under 
which compliance with one signatory’s securities laws is viewed as be-
ing equivalent to compliance with all signatories’ securities laws.
96
  
 
 90 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (arguing that for much of the twen-
tieth century the United States was able to use its dominance in terms of its capital 
markets and system of securities regulation to export its theories of securities regula-
tion to other nations and regions). 
 91 See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Securities and Exchange Commission’s International 
Technical Assistance Program, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_ 
emergtech.shtml (last visited May 12, 2010) (describing the SEC’s international 
technical assistance program, a program that is “helping improve market develop-
ment and enforcement capacity around the world through its flagship International 
Institutes, bilateral missions, and regional training programs”). 
 92 See supra note 37 and accompanying text (explaining that the United States’ 
ability to be a coordinating force in international securities law has waned because its 
dominance in terms of its capital markets and system of securities regulation is reced-
ing); supra note 73 and accompanying text (arguing that the world is transitioning to 
a regulatory competition approach to international securities regulation). 
 93 See Tarullo, supra note 86, at 495 (noting that under a strong regulatory con-
vergence model, “[e]ven where formal agreements do exist, they are generally not 
binding as a matter of international law, and are often tantamount to points of refer-
ence for the ongoing cooperative activities rather than a code of conduct”). 
 94 Id. 
 95 See, e.g., infra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing IOSCO’s Multilater-
al Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and 
the Exchange of Information to which many nations have become signatories). 
 96 See Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem for the Retail Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1127 
(2009) (“Under a ‘mutual recognition’ regime, certain foreign issuers would be 
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For example, an issuer who registers an offering in one nation with a 
mutual recognition agreement with a second nation would be free to 
sell its securities in that second nation, even though the securities are 
registered only in the first nation.
97
 
The United States has flirted with the idea of taking a mutual 
recognition approach to international securities regulation.  In 2007, 
Ethiopis Tafara and Robert Peterson, two staff members in the SEC’s 
Office of International Affairs, published A Blueprint for Cross-Border 
Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework in the Harvard In-
ternational Law Journal.
98
  In the article Tafara and Peterson propose a 
new legal framework to allow foreign financial service providers (e.g., 
foreign stock exchanges and foreign broker-dealers) to operate in the 
United States based on compliance with their home country’s securi-
ties laws.
99
  To ensure that high standards of regulation would be 
maintained, Tafara and Peterson propose to limit this system of subs-
titute compliance to countries with similar regulation and enforce-
ment practices as the United States.
100
  Initially, the SEC, under the 
leadership of Chairman Christopher Cox, warmly received Tafara 
and Peterson’s proposal and convened meetings regarding how the 
proposal might be implemented.
101
  After the confirmation of Chair-
man Mary Schapiro in January 2009, however, the Tafara and Peter-
 
permitted to list their shares on U.S. exchanges and sell shares to U.S. investors with-
out being subject to the full panoply of U.S. securities laws and regulations.  These 
issuers would be subject only to the laws of their home country.”). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. 
Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 31 (2007). 
 99 See id. at 32 (“This Article proposes a new framework to apply to foreign finan-
cial service providers accessing the U.S. capital market . . . .  Rather than requiring 
such foreign stock exchanges and foreign broker-dealers to register with the SEC, as 
is currently the case, the proposed framework relies on a system of substituted com-
pliance with SEC regulations.”). 
 100 See id. (“By constructing a new model for international cooperation between 
the SEC and certain like-minded foreign securities regulators, the framework will fa-
cilitate the SEC’s ability to protect U.S. investors and lead to a collaborative effort in 
promoting high-quality regulatory standards in a globalized market.”). 
 101 See Karmel, supra note 37, at 1708–09 (“Following the publication of the Tafara 
article and favorable comments upon it, the SEC held a Roundtable on Mutual Rec-
ognition. . . . Mutual recognition of foreign markets and broker-dealers was also 
promoted in speeches by the Director of the Division of Market Regulation.”); Pan, 
supra note 37, at 223 (“Since the publication of this proposal, SEC Chairman Chris-
topher Cox and other senior SEC officials have openly discussed and endorsed the 
merits of mutual recognition, and the SEC has held public meetings to discuss how 
such a proposal should be implemented.”). 
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son proposal appears to have been tabled or even outright rejected 
by the SEC.
102
 
A fifth approach to international securities regulation is founded 
on regulatory harmonization.  Under a regulatory harmonization ap-
proach, nations agree via treaty or other agreement to make their se-
curities laws identical and equivalent.
103
  Although harmonization is 
very similar to a strong regulatory convergence approach, harmoniza-
tion is different because strong convergence sets only basic regulatory 
norms and allows the individual nations to construct their own sys-
tems of securities laws based on those norms.
104
  A harmonization ap-
proach requires that the securities laws of all signatory nations be 
identical and equivalent without providing individual nations the 
ability to experiment in how to achieve the norms underlying the 
regulatory system.
105
  Regulatory harmonization can be used either to 
set a floor of regulation, which allows individual nations to upwardly 
depart, or it can be used to set out a comprehensive system of regula-
tion.
106
 
Finally, regulatory centralization is a sixth approach to interna-
tional securities law.  Under a regulatory centralization approach, na-
tions would join together to create an international organization that 
would have monitoring, regulatory, and/or enforcement responsibil-
ities relating to the emerging global capital markets.
107
  The extent of 
the monitoring, regulatory, or enforcement powers of this centralized 
global regulator would ultimately be determined by the nations 
agreeing to subject themselves to its authority.
108
  For example, this 
centralized global regulator could be given solely monitoring func-
 
 102 See Dan Jamieson, Schapiro Cool to ‘Mutual Recognition’ Efforts, INVESTMENT NEWS 
(Feb. 1, 2009), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20090201/REG/302019997 
(“Bold efforts by the Bush administration Securities and Exchange Commission to 
open the doors to foreign brokerage firms are likely to be put on hold by new 
Chairman Mary Schapiro.”). 
 103 See Sidney A. Shapiro, International Trade Agreements, Regulatory Protection, and 
Public Accountability, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 435, 436 (2002) (“Harmonization involves the 
adoption of an international standard that adjusts the regulatory standards or proce-
dures of two or more countries until they are the same.”). 
 104 See Edward F. Greene, Beyond Borders Part II: A New Approach to the Regulation of 
Global Securities Offerings, in FOREIGN ISSUERS & THE U.S. SECURITIES LAWS 2008: 
STRATEGIES FOR THE CHANGING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 607, 612 (Practising Law 
Inst. ed., 2008) (“Harmonization . . . addresses duplicative or overlapping regulations 
by making them identical or, at the very least, consistent.”). 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 See Jackson, supra note 78, at 656–57 (explaining the regulatory centralization 
approach to international securities law). 
 108 Id. 
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tions or could be charged with creating and enforcing a baseline of 
regulation from which participating nations could opt to upwardly 
depart. 
Although the world is transitioning to a regulatory competition 
approach to international securities law, because of the increasing in-
ability of the United States to fuel convergence of national systems of 
securities regulation and enforcement,
109
 many nations have ex-
pressed at least a limited interest in a centralization approach to in-
ternational securities regulation.
110
  For example, many securities 
regulators engage in bilateral or multilateral dialogues with securities 
regulators from other nations to promote coordination and coopera-
tion regarding transnational securities regulation and enforcement 
issues.
111
  Moreover, a number of international organizations have 
emerged to promote coordination and cooperation among national 
securities regulators.
112
 
The most significant of these organizations is likely the Interna-
tional Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”).  IOSCO 
was founded in 1983 as a successor to an inter-American organization 
that promoted coordination and cooperation among securities regu-
 
 109 See supra note 73 and accompanying text (arguing that the world is transition-
ing to a regulatory competition approach to international securities regulation); su-
pra note 37 (arguing that the United States’ ability to act as a coordinating force in 
international securities law has begun to diminish because of its waning dominance 
in terms of its capital markets and system of securities regulation). 
 110 See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Directors in Cross-Border 
Securities Litigation, 35 J. CORP. L. 71, 72 (2009) (“The regulatory community has de-
veloped a range of mechanisms that explicitly address securities fraud as a global is-
sue. These include cooperation and coordination instruments such as bilateral me-
moranda of understanding between regulatory agencies, as well as the work of 
multilateral organizations such as the International Organization of Securities Com-
missions.”). 
 111 See Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of 
Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L. 865, 928 (2008) (“In the 
international arena [of financial regulation], cooperation among regulators has 
evolved from bilateral agreements to multilateral agreements in the form of partici-
pation in international organizations.”); but see Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Glob-
al Implications of the Securitization of U.S. Housing Debt, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77, 111 
(“While a range of bilateral and multilateral agreements exist between nations they 
deal mostly with issues of cross border enforcement and assistance with securities in-
vestigations.  There is currently no international treaty in force which specifically fo-
cuses on the global capital market.”). 
 112 See Langevoort, supra note 47, at 205 (“The key to global securities regulation 
in the future will be the construction of institutions to articulate world-wide stan-
dards that command legitimacy and respect.  IASB is moving toward being such a 
standard-setter, and the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) is taking shape toward being another.”). 
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lators in North and South America.
113
  Currently, IOSCO’s members 
regulate more than ninety percent of the world’s securities markets 
and represent more than one hundred jurisdictions.
114
  Throughout 
IOSCO’s history, it has served as a centralizing force in international 
securities law in a variety of circumstances.  For example, in 1998, 
IOSCO adopted an influential set of advisory standards and bench-
marks for regulating securities markets, called the Objectives and 
Principles of Securities Regulation (“Principles”).
115
  Moreover, in 
2002, IOSCO adopted a multilateral memorandum of understanding 
(“Memorandum of Understanding”) designed to facilitate transna-
tional enforcement and information sharing among securities regula-
tors throughout the world.
116
 
IOSCO, however, fails to provide the regulatory harmonization 
and centralization that is necessary to regulate the emerging global 
capital markets.  IOSCO mainly serves coordinating and monitoring 
functions, rather than being a centralized force for regulation and 
enforcement in international securities law.
117
  In terms of regulation, 
compliance with IOSCO’s Principles or Memorandum of Under-
standing, which IOSCO touts among its greatest successes, are volun-
tary until an individual nation chooses to adopt them.
118
  In terms of 
enforcement, IOSCO’s Principles on very rare occasion have been 
used publicly to identify nations with poor systems of securities regu-
 
 113 See IOSCO Historical Background, OICV-IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/about/ 
index.cfm?section=background (last visited Sept. 25, 2010) (“[IOSCO] was created 
in 1983 with the decision to change from an inter-American regional association 
(created in 1974) into a global cooperative body.  Eleven securities regulatory agen-
cies from North and South America took [sic] this decision in April 1983 at a meet-
ing in Quito, Ecuador.”). 
 114 Id. (“Its membership regulates more than 95% of the world’s securities mar-
kets and it is the primary international cooperative forum for securities market regu-
latory agencies.  IOSCO members are drawn from, and regulate, over 100 jurisdic-
tions and its membership continues to grow.”). 
 115 INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES 
ORGANIZATION (Sept. 1998), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/ 
pdf/IOSCOPD82.pdf. 
 116 INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, MULTILATERAL MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
CONCERNING CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION AND THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION 
(May 2002), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/ 
IOSCOPD126.pdf. 
 117 The International Organization of Securities Commissions, OICV-IOSCO, 
http://www.iosco.org/about (last visited Sept. 25, 2010) (explaining that IOSCO’s 
main purposes are to coordinate among securities regulators and monitor the global 
securities markets, rather than providing an independent source of regulation and 
enforcement). 
 118 See supra notes 115–16. 
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lation, but beyond this type of public shaming, IOSCO lacks the pow-
er to enforce any of the standards that it establishes.
119
 
III. THE ARGUMENT FOR THE HARMONIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION 
OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW 
The world should adopt an approach based on harmonization 
and centralization to international securities law.  Nations through-
out the world should harmonize their securities laws to allow for the 
creation of a centralized global securities regulator.  Then, nations 
should negotiate treaties and other agreements to allow a centralized 
global securities regulator with robust monitoring, regulatory, and 
enforcement powers to come into being.  The centralized global se-
curities regulator should then set a baseline of securities regulation 
from which nations can choose to upwardly depart, if they desire.  Al-
though this approach may seem drastic and unrealistic based on the 
current global political climate and the probable unwillingness of 
most regulators to cede power,
120
 a harmonized and centralized sys-
tem of international securities regulation offers the best approach to 
international securities law because it would minimize systemic risk, 
increase efficiency of the emerging global capital markets, and pool 
the expertise and experience of the world’s securities regulators. 
A. Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities Law 
Minimize Risk in the Emerging Global Capital Markets 
The emergence of global capital markets has caused the emer-
gence of global systemic risk.  Global capital markets offer a variety of 
benefits.  Investors are afforded breadth and depth of investment op-
portunities and new options for portfolio diversification.
121
  Issuers 
can seek capital from a wider variety of sources, and the amount of 
 
 119 See Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CALIF.  L. REV. 327, 
340–41 (2010) (“Noncompliance with IOSCO rules is not generally met with any re-
taliation, though it has led to overt economic sanctions in one context.  In 2000 and 
2001, international authorities publicly identified twenty-three countries as having 
poor regulatory governance, due in part to their nonobservance of IOSCO stan-
dards.”). 
 120 See Langevoort, supra note 47, at 205 (arguing that “we will not see a global se-
curities and financial services regulator—something as dramatic as a Global Financial 
Services Commission—anytime soon”). 
 121 See Madison & Greene, supra note 34, at 99 (“The rapid pace of technological 
advances is bringing us closer to the reality of a seamless global capital market.  In 
such a world, investors would have access to increased liquidity, greater diversifica-
tion, and a wider range of investment options regardless of their location.”). 
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capital available is greater.
122
  In addition, broker-dealers, investment 
advisors, and other market participants can make additional profits 
by providing new services.
123
  Despite all of these benefits, the globali-
zation of capital markets also creates additional global systemic risks.  
As the financial world has become more interconnected, financial 
crises are more likely to be global events, rather than national or re-
gional occurrences.
124
  Harmonization and centralization of interna-
tional securities law helps to reduce systemic risk because it ends the 
race-to-the-bottom that is occurring in international securities regula-
tion, provides a seamless system of regulation that prevents regulatory 
and enforcement gaps, and reduces spillover risks from regional or 
national financial crises. 
A harmonization and centralization approach to international 
securities regulation will end the race-to-the-bottom in international 
securities law.  The financial crisis that began in 2008 occurred in 
part because no nation wanted to ratchet up the level of regulation 
on the mortgage-backed securities that were at the heart of the cri-
sis.
125
  The United States did not want to increase the level of regula-
tion out of fear that it would impact the prosperity that it was expe-
riencing and that it would render it less competitive in the emerging 
global capital markets.
126
  Other nations did not increase the level of 
regulation on mortgage-backed securities out of fear that it would 
render their nations less competitive because they would be unable to 
receive the benefits of the United States’ prosperity.
127
  A harmonized 
and centralized approach to international securities regulation would 
end the race-to-the-bottom because it would create a centralized 
global securities regulator to create a baseline of regulation and en-
 
 122 See Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C. L. REV. 89, 
90–91 (2007) (“Finance is now global.  The halcyon days when the U.S. capital mar-
kets were the primary place to raise capital and list securities are over.  Non-U.S. cap-
ital markets have matured; issuers have increasing latitude and choice as to where 
they list and obtain capital.  They have exercised this freedom with a vengeance.”). 
 123 See RICHARD DALE, RISK AND REGULATION IN GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKETS 1 
(1996) (“Within the past two decades international financial markets have been 
transformed by three key developments: globalization of the financial services indus-
try; functional integration of banking and securities business; and financial innova-
tion, particularly in the derivative product area.”). 
 124 See Karmel, supra note 30, at 33 (“Stock market crashes and financial firm fail-
ures have become international, just like trading markets.”). 
 125 See supra Part II.B (discussing the relationship between international securities 
regulation and the Great Recession and crediting the Great Recession to a race-to-
the-bottom in international securities law). 
 126 See supra Part II.B. 
 127 See supra Part II.B. 
CHAFFEE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2010  3:58 PM 
2010] FINISHING THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM 1605 
forcement.  A floor of regulation and enforcement would be set, and 
nations and regions could not adopt a level of regulation below it. 
Harmonization and centralization also minimize global systemic 
risk because they create a seamless system of regulation that elimi-
nates the regulatory and enforcement gaps that exist under all other 
approaches to international securities law.  As previously explained, 
the world is transitioning to global capital markets.
128
  Although these 
capital markets are far from seamless because of the barriers created 
by the current patchwork of national and regional regulation, the 
emerging global capital markets are sufficiently international that a 
seamless system of regulation is needed to eliminate the regulatory 
and enforcement gaps created by the current patchwork of regula-
tion.
129
  The other approaches to international securities regulation 
discussed earlier in this Article all involve some degree of regulatory 
fragmentation, which permits regulatory and enforcement gaps to ex-
ist.
130
  A harmonized and centralized approach to international secur-
ities law would provide the type of seamless regulation necessary to 
eliminate regulatory and enforcement gaps because a centralized 
global securities regulator would be charged with robust monitoring, 
enforcement, and regulatory powers to prevent such gaps. 
In addition, a harmonized and centralized system provides the 
type of seamless regulation necessary to prevent the collective action 
problems that exist under other approaches to international securi-
ties law.  Regulatory fragmentation invites free rider problems in 
which nations purposefully fail to invest adequate money and re-
sources in regulation and enforcement in the hope that other nations 
will address problems that arise.
131
  Furthermore, other models of in-
ternational securities regulation can create a bystander effect in 
which nations witnessing the same problem fail to act because they 
assume that some other nation will deal with the issue.
132
  A harmoni-
 
 128 See supra Part II.A (discussing the transition from national or regional capital 
markets to global capital markets). 
 129 See Tafara & Peterson, supra note 98, at 32 (“[T]he current international envi-
ronment has enforcement and oversight gaps that present risks that do not exist in a 
domestic context.”). 
 130 See supra Part II.C (discussing six possible models for international securities 
law). 
 131 See Langevoort, supra note 47, at 204 (“When trading is heavily fragmented, no 
nation is able to capture enough of the benefits from investments in quality regula-
tion.  It is a classic free rider problem.”); see also Jackson, supra note 33, at 115 (“As it 
turns out, countries with quite similar regulatory systems may expend very different 
amounts of resources on supervisory oversight [of their securities markets].”). 
 132 See Damien Schiff, Samaritans: Good, Bad and Ugly: A Comparative Law Analysis, 
11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 77, 112 (2005) (explaining that the bystander effect 
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zation and centralization approach to international securities law 
would remedy these and other collective issues because it would 
create a centralized global securities regulator that would serve as a 
focal point for action on monitoring, regulation, and enforcement. 
Harmonization and centralization of international securities law 
also helps to minimize global systemic risk because it reduces spillov-
er risks from regional or national financial crises.  Because capital 
markets are global,
133
 any future financial crisis is likely to be global as 
well.
134
  Issues in national or regional markets can quickly and easily 
spill into other nations and regions.
135
  The creation of a centralized 
global securities regulator would reduce this risk because such a regu-
lator would provide an additional layer of monitoring, regulation, 
and enforcement that would help to prevent or lessen the impact of 
any national or regional financial crisis. 
B. Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities Law 
Increase Market Efficiency 
Obtaining an optimal level of regulation involves not only reduc-
ing systemic risk but also considerations of market efficiency.
136
  A 
market can be regulated in a manner that almost completely elimi-
nates systemic risk but creates a level of regulation that is so onerous 
and inefficient that no one will want to participate in that market.
137
  
 
occurs in situations in which “[r]esponsibility for affirmative conduct is perceived as 
diffused among all present; fear of being reproved by others or of impeding a better 
rescuer discourages rescue activity from individuals within a bystander group”); Eliz-
abeth C. Tippett, The Promise of Compelled Whistleblowing: What the Corporate Governance 
Provisions of Oxley Mean for Employment Law, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1 (2007) (de-
scribing the bystander effect as “where groups fail to act in emergencies because in-
dividuals assume that others will intervene or that others are failing to act because 
the situation does not merit attention”). 
 133 See supra Part II.A (explaining that capital markets have transitioned from be-
ing national or regional in nature to being global). 
 134 See supra note 124 and accompanying text (suggesting that globalization of cap-
ital markets creates increased risk that financial crises will be global events, rather 
than national or regional occurrences). 
 135 See Jackson, supra note 33, at 112 (“An interesting challenge in the regulation 
of foreign investments is the possibility of spillover effects in the United States when 
things go wrong overseas, like the Parmalat scandal on the Asian financial crisis of 
1997.”). 
 136 See Vern R. Walker, Risk Regulation and the “Faces” of Uncertainty, 9 RISK 27, 38 
(1998) (“Risk regulation is, in the end, regulation, and the optimal combination of 
effectiveness, efficiency and equity is all we can ever hope to achieve.”). 
 137 See Rodney A. Smolla, Contemplating the Meaning of “The Rule of Law”, 42 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2007) (“Over-regulation of economic markets acts as a drag on 
investment and entrepreneurial enterprise; over-regulation of political systems inter-
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A harmonization and centralization approach to international securi-
ties regulation would increase market efficiency over the current ap-
proach to international securities law, which is based on regulatory 
competition, because it would reduce transaction costs, remove bar-
riers to efficiency, and increase investor confidence. 
Harmonization and centralization of international securities law 
would reduce a variety of transaction costs created by the current sys-
tem of regulatory competition.  Under the current system, issuers 
must pay the initial costs of determining which national regulatory 
regimes apply to their offerings and under which national regulatory 
regimes it would be most beneficial to issue securities.
138
  Then, issu-
ers must pay the costs of complying with the registration and anti-
fraud provisions in each nation in which they choose to make an of-
fering.
139
  Similarly, broker-dealers, investment advisors, and other 
market intermediaries must pay the cost of complying with the law in 
each nation in which they choose to operate.  The costs of issuers, 
broker-dealers, investment advisors, and other market intermediaries 
are then passed along to investors.
140
  Additionally, investors must 
bear information gathering costs that are created by operating within 
a regulatory system in which different nations require different levels 
of disclosure and have varying definitions of what constitutes securi-
 
feres with democracy and discourages civic participation; over-regulation of the mar-
ketplace of ideas stifles creativity and discovery in the arts and sciences.”). 
 138 See Jackson, supra note 33, at 118 (“To date, most economic research on globa-
lization of capital markets has explored the benefits of cross-border financings to is-
suers.  Hence, a common measure of the benefits of globalization is the reduction in 
cost of capital for issuers.”). 
 139 Greene, supra note 36, at 88 (noting that one of the benefits of breaking down 
regulatory barriers between nations is that “[i]ssuers, both within and outside the 
United States, will gain access to a wider pool of investors and benefit from a reduced 
cost of capital”). 
 140 See Greene, supra note 36, at 88 (“Breaking down the barriers between U.S. 
financial markets and comparably regulated non-U.S. financial markets will benefit 
both U.S. and non-U.S. market participants.  U.S. investors will benefit from more 
efficient execution of transactions in non-U.S. securities.  Non-U.S. investors will si-
milarly benefit from more efficient execution of transactions in U.S. securities.”); Ta-
fara & Peterson, supra note 98, at 48.   
U.S. investors are free to purchase such securities on foreign stock ex-
changes, and many do.  Indeed, over the past two years, U.S. retail in-
vestment abroad has surged dramatically, mostly as a result of investors 
seeking higher overseas returns made possible by the devaluation of 
the U.S. dollar.  However, the process can be cumbersome and compa-
ratively expensive. 
Id. 
CHAFFEE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2010  3:58 PM 
1608 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1581 
ties fraud.
141
  Investors also have the added costs of determining what 
restrictions are placed upon the resale of any securities that they pur-
chase.
142
  Finally, the current system of regulatory competition places 
an added financial burden on regulators who must engage in trans-
national monitoring of fraud, which is made more difficult by the 
current system of regulatory fragmentation.
143
  A harmonization and 
centralization approach to international securities law eliminates or 
reduces all of these costs by creating a standardized, cohesive system 
of regulation that does not vary from nation to nation (i.e., market 
participants must comply with only one standard). 
Transitioning to a harmonization and centralization approach to 
international securities regulation also increases market efficiency by 
removing barriers to the free flow of capital.  As previously explained, 
capital markets have become global.
144
  This does not mean, however, 
that these capital markets are seamless and that capital can flow freely 
and efficiently throughout the world.
145
  The world saw the birth of 
the first transnational stock exchange with the completion of the 
merger between the New York Stock Exchange and Euronext on 
April 4, 2007,
146
 and this merger has created a push for stock ex-
change consolidation throughout the world.
147
  Securities regulation, 
however, remains set at a national or regional level, creating barriers 
 
 141 See Jackson, supra note 33, at 111 (“Aside from technical barriers, U.S. retail 
investors face serious problems receiving information about foreign investment op-
portunities.  Most notably, foreign broker-dealers are prohibited from soliciting most 
U.S. retail investors unless those firms comply with SEC registration and compliance 
requirements.”). 
 142 See generally Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The SEC and Foreign Companies—A Balance of 
Competing Interest, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 457 (2010) (discussing the rules placed upon 
foreign companies wishing to raise capital in the United States, including restrictions 
that are placed upon investors who purchase and want to resell their securities). 
 143 See Greene, supra note 36, at 86 (“The SEC must find a way to work with its 
counterparts outside the United States to eliminate barriers to cross-border invest-
ment. . . . The current U.S. regulatory scheme makes cross-border investment costly 
and inefficient.”). 
 144 See supra Part II.A (analyzing the transition from national or regional capital 
markets to global capital markets). 
 145 See Greene, supra note 36, at 97 (“The SEC must acknowledge that the securi-
ties markets have evolved beyond jurisdictional borders and that its current regulato-
ry regime has resulted in barriers to competition and placed roadblocks in the way of 
investor access to cross-border investment opportunities that have contributed to in-
creased costs and market inefficiencies.”). 
 146 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing the merger between the 
New York Stock Exchange and Euronext). 
 147 See supra notes 44–46 (discussing the push for stock exchange consolidation 
throughout the world that was touched off by the New York Stock Exchange and Eu-
ronext merger). 
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to the seamless operation of these newly emerging transnational ex-
changes.
148
  In the absence of harmonization and centralization of in-
ternational securities regulation, the emerging global securities mar-
kets will operate less efficiently because of the barriers created by 
having to comply with fragmented national securities regulation.
149
 
Transitioning to a harmonization and centralization approach to 
international securities regulation also increases market efficiency 
because it increases investor confidence, which yields both market 
participation and market stability.  One of the key requirements for 
creating an efficient market for securities is having a large number of 
market participants.
150
  Investor confidence is important because in-
vestors will not invest in a market, or hold the securities that they do 
purchase for a long period of time, if they believe that they have in-
adequate information or that they are going to be the victim of 
fraud.
151
  The current system of international securities regulation en-
genders such negative beliefs because regulatory competition makes 
 
 148 See Pan, supra note 39, at 137 (“The utmost economic benefits of the [New 
York Stock Exchange and Euronext] merger will be realized only if the exchanges 
are able to consolidate trading into one platform with a single order book, thereby 
achieving economies of scale and maximizing liquidity.”). 
 149 See Susanne Kalss, Recent Development in Liability for Nondisclosure of Capital Market 
Information, 27 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 70, 76 (2007) (“The benefit of centralising 
fragmented supervisory powers for the securities markets lie in improving cost effi-
ciency for the benefit of the supervised institutions as well as for consumers of finan-
cial services.”); Tafara & Peterson, supra note 98, at 32 (“Our markets are now inter-
connected and viewing them in isolation—as we have for so long—is no longer the 
best approach to protecting our investors, promoting an efficient and transparent 
U.S. market, or facilitating capital formation for U.S. issuers.”).  
 150 See Tafara & Peterson, supra note 98, at 46 (“An efficient capital market also 
requires a degree of egalitarianism and blindness to national origin.  Ceteris paribus, 
the larger the pool of investors bidding on a company’s securities, the more efficient-
ly the price of those securities will be set and the more liquid the market for them 
will be.”). 
 151 See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities 
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 783 (2001) (“[T]here are two essential prerequisites 
for strong public securities markets.  A country’s laws and related institutions must 
give minority shareholders: (1) good information about the value of a company’s 
business; and (2) confidence that the company’s insiders (its managers and control-
ling shareholders) won’t cheat investors out of most or all of the value of their in-
vestment through ‘self-dealing’ transactions (transactions between a company and its 
insiders or another firm that the insiders control) or even outright theft.”); see also 
Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, 
Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 999 (2006) (“The logic of federal securi-
ties regulation . . . is that the mandatory disclosure regime of the federal securities 
laws shores up investor confidence and the integrity of securities markets by redress-
ing information asymmetries and targeting fraud.  Mandatory disclosure and federal 
antifraud provisions, in the conventional view, encourage investors to invest, leading 
to more efficient and more highly valued securities markets.”). 
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information gathering more difficult,
152
 creates a fragmented system 
of regulation that is difficult to understand,
153
 and suggests that regu-
lators are going to ratchet down their systems of regulation to attract 
issuers.
154
  A harmonization and centralization approach to interna-
tional securities regulation increases investor confidence by making 
information gathering easier, creating a simpler system of regulation, 
and preventing regulators from ratcheting down their systems of reg-
ulation to attract issuers because such an approach creates a single, 
uniform system regulation on a global basis. 
C. Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities Law 
Pool the Expertise and Experience of the World’s Securities 
Regulators 
A regulatory competition approach to international securities 
law creates tension among regulators to attract issuers, investors, and 
other market participants to their particular nation or region.
155
  Al-
though most nations have shown a willingness to participate in inter-
national organizations that encourage coordination and cooperation 
among securities regulators (e.g., IOSCO),
156
 a regulatory competi-
tion approach to international securities law necessarily creates some 
reluctance to share technical information.
157
  Even if a nation engages 
in a robust exchange of technical information, this does not guaran-
 
 152 See supra note 141 and accompanying text (explaining that the current pat-
chwork of national securities regulation makes information gathering in emerging 
global capital markets more difficult). 
 153 See Karmel, supra note 30, at 39 (“In globalized capital markets, many violations 
of securities laws are transnational.  This means that unless national laws are given 
extraterritorial effect, there will be inadequate law enforcement, but if laws are ap-
plied extraterritorially, there will be conflict between regulators and confusion on 
the part of regulated persons as to what are the proper rules.”). 
 154 See Pan, supra note 37, at 235 (noting the concern “that any difference in regu-
latory standards between the United States and the foreign jurisdiction will give rise 
to regulatory arbitrage.  Less rigorous foreign regulation will favor foreign exchanges 
and broker-dealers over U.S. exchanges and broker-dealers and encourage U.S. mar-
ket participants to establish operations abroad to take advantage of the regulatory 
differences.”). 
 155 See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text (defining and discussing a regu-
latory competition approach to international securities law). 
 156 See supra notes 113–19 (providing an overview of IOSCO and its activities). 
 157 See Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to 
Financial Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 39, 107 (2009) (“There is ongoing and increasing regulatory competi-
tion among national securities regulators, operating in part and indirectly through 
their stock exchanges.  That competition is mediated, but only slightly, by efforts to 
harmonize regulation that the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
and entities like it have made.”). 
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tee that the rest of the world will pay attention.  For example, the 
United States engages in vigorous efforts to share its expertise and 
experience through its Technical Assistance Program,
158
 and a race-to-
the-bottom has still emerged because the United States has become 
less able to fuel regulatory convergence in terms of international se-
curities regulation.
159
  Harmonization and centralization of interna-
tional securities law is beneficial because it pools the expertise and 
experience of the world’s securities regulators.  Although a centra-
lized global securities regulator would have to be structured in such a 
way to allow for the effective pooling of technical information, a 
harmonization and centralization approach offers the best opportu-
nity for sharing the expertise and experience of the United States, 
the European Union, and the rest of the world. 
Although the dominance of the United States is waning in terms 
of its capital markets and its role as a securities regulator,
160
 the Unit-
ed States has a wealth of expertise and experience to offer the rest of 
the world.  The United States entered the twentieth century with a 
privatized system of securities regulation under which securities ex-
changes determined the rules governing issuers, investors, and mar-
ket participants.
161
  When this approach proved ineffective to prevent 
fraud, states began adopting securities statutes, which are commonly 
referred to as “blue sky laws.”
162
  This model of regulatory competition 
persisted throughout the 1910s and 1920s until the patchwork of 
regulation created by the blue sky laws proved ineffective to prevent 
 
 158 Securities and Exchange Commission’s International Technical Assistance 
Program, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_emergtech.shtml (last visited July 8, 
2010) (providing an overview of the SEC’s Technical Assistance Program, which 
“provides training to nearly 2000 regulatory and law enforcement officials from over 
100 countries”). 
 159 See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (explaining that the role of the 
United States as a security regulator and its ability to serve as a coordinating force in 
international securities law has been waning). 
 160 See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (explaining that the dominance 
of the United States in terms of its capital markets and role as a securities regulator is 
waning as global capital markets have begun to emerge). 
 161 See supra note 78 and accompanying text (reporting that prior to the adoption 
of state codes of securities regulation in the 1910s and the 1920s, the United States 
employed a privatized system of securities regulation in which the securities ex-
changes were the primary sources of regulation of market participants). 
 162 See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 18–19 (6th ed. 
2009) (providing an overview of the adoption of state codes of securities regulation 
in the 1910s and 1920s in the United States). 
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the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression.
163
  With the 
enactment of the Securities Act of 1933
164
  and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,
165
 the United States adopted a centralized ap-
proach to domestic securities law.  Section 4(a) of the 1934 Act 
created the SEC to serve as a centralized regulatory body within this 
new regulatory system.
166
  As a result of this centralized approach, the 
securities markets in the United States remained relatively stable until 
a patchwork of regulation created a race-to-the-bottom on the inter-
national level.
167
  Based on this history, the United States has a wealth 
of information to offer to the rest of the world, including expertise 
and experience regarding transitioning between regulatory models 
and maintaining relatively stable securities markets under a regulato-
ry centralization model. 
Under a harmonization and centralization approach to interna-
tional securities law, the European Union also can offer a wealth of 
technical information to the world.  Europe spent most of the twen-
 
 163 See id. at 18 (“Following the enactment of the early state securities laws, federal 
legislation was successfully resisted for a while.  However, the stock market crash of 
1929 is properly described as the straw that broke the camel’s back.  The era that fol-
lowed ushered in federal securities regulation.”); see also Eric C. Chaffee, Standing 
Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: The Continued Validity of the Forced Seller Exception to 
the Purchaser-Seller Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 843, 851 (2009) (reporting that the 
“inconsistent patchwork of securities regulation” created by the blue sky laws had 
been “largely ineffective in preventing fraud”).  
 164 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006). 
 165 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006). 
 166 Id. § 78d(a) (providing for the establishment of the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission). 
 167 See John M. Fedders, Policing Trans-Border Fraud in the United States Securities 
Markets: The “Waiver by Conduct” Concept—A Possible Alternative or a Starting Point for 
Discussions?, 11 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 477, 504–05 n.50 (1985).  
[P]articipation in the United States securities markets from a foreign 
country is a direct and intentional act to take advantage of the speed, 
fairness, stability, and liquidity of the American markets. . . . The effort 
to preserve the American securities markets springs from a genuine 
concern for the regulation and integrity of a finite and specific mar-
ketplace. 
Id.; see also Eric C. Chaffee, Beyond Blue Chip: Issuer Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief Un-
der Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Without the Purchase or Sale of Security, 36 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1135, 1139 (2006) (explaining that Congress enacted the Securities Act and the 
Exchange Act in part to provide for the stability of the national capital markets and 
to prevent “national emergencies created by unreasonable fluctuations in security 
prices”); James D. Cox, Choice of Law Rules for International Securities Transactions?, 66 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1179, 1187 (1998) (“The U.S. securities laws were enacted in the af-
termath of the Great Depression and their history and content were much influ-
enced by our experience and faith that fair and orderly markets are a cornerstone 
for not just economic stability, but social stability.”). 
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tieth century with a number of discrete national securities markets.
168
  
In 1957, the Treaty Establishing the European Community (“EC 
Treaty”) helped form the European Communities, which is the pre-
decessor to the European Union.
169
  One of the stated goals of the EC 
Treaty was the development of common capital markets.
170
  During 
the following decades, the European Union adopted various direc-
tives that required its member nations to harmonize their securities 
laws.
171
  In June 2001, the European Commission opted to create the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (“CESR”) to oversee 
the securities markets in the European Union.
172
  As a result of the fi-
nancial crisis that began in 2008, a proposal has been made to re-
place CESR with the European Securities and Markets Authority, an 
entity with more robust monitoring, regulatory, and enforcement 
powers.
173
  Because of this history, the European Union has a variety 
of expertise and experience to offer the world, which includes in-
sights on the process of transitioning to a harmonized and centra-
lized regulatory model, the use of directives to harmonize national 
securities laws, and the need for a centralized securities regulator. 
Finally, the creation of a harmonized and centralized system of 
international securities law would allow for the pooling and sharing 
of the expertise and experience of those regulating the emerging 
global capital markets.  Strong markets have begun to develop in 
 
 168 See Langevoort, supra note 47, at 194.  
The United States gained an extraordinary advantage in the aftermath 
of World War II because its capital markets and economic infrastruc-
ture were undamaged, while Europe and Japan had to rebuild out of 
devastation. . . . That did not change appreciably until the 1980s, at 
which point a growing number of countries—the United Kingdom in 
particular—made very deliberate efforts to open their financial mar-
kets and compete with the United States. 
Id. 
 169 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 11. 
 170 Id. at art. 3(c) (providing that one of the goals of ratifying the EC Treaty was 
“the abolition, as between Member States, of the obstacles to the free movement of 
persons, services, and capital”). 
 171 See Karmel, supra note 30, at 14 (“The mechanism chosen for integration of the 
financial markets [in the European Union] was a series of directives to harmonize 
essential standards throughout the EU and to enable financial regulators to practice 
home country control, but oblige them to honor principles of mutual recognition.”). 
 172 Commission Decision 2001/527, 2001 O.J. (L 191) 43 (EC) (approving the 
creation of the Committee of European Securities Regulators to oversee the capital 
market created by the member states of the European Union). 
 173 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a 
European Securities and Markets Authority, COM (2009) 503 final (Sept. 23, 2009). 
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Asia, Europe, and South America.
174
  The experiences of regulators in 
these emerging markets are as important to understand as the expe-
riences of regulators in the United States and European Union.  Cap-
ital markets have become global.
175
  The components of these global 
capital markets, however, continue to develop.  Understanding the 
experiences of recently developed national securities markets gives 
insight as to how the global capital markets will develop in the future. 
IV. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE HARMONIZATION AND 
CENTRALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW 
Although a strong case exists for the harmonization and centra-
lization of international securities law, critics have posited a number 
of arguments against harmonization and centralization.  These ar-
guments against harmonization and centralization are usually based 
on claims that such an approach to international securities law pre-
vents the benefits of regulatory competition, is impossible to imple-
ment, and results in an unwanted loss of autonomy for the United 
States.  Although each of these arguments has some validity, the case 
for harmonization and centralization outweighs all of the arguments 
against it. 
Many opponents of a model of international securities law based 
on harmonization and centralization argue that such an approach 
prevents the benefits of regulatory competition.
176
  These opponents 
claim that such an approach to international securities law creates a 
suboptimal regulatory regime because a harmonization and centrali-
zation approach hinders regulatory innovation and prevents a race-
to-the-top as national regulators compete to attract issuers, investors, 
and other market participants.
177
 
For a variety of reasons, the benefits of regulatory competition 
are offset by its harms.  First, even if regulatory competition encou-
 
 174 See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text (reporting that capital markets in 
Asia, Europe, and South America have grown in both size and sophistication, includ-
ing the development of strong markets in Brazil, Russia, India, and China, which are 
commonly referred to as the “BRIC” nations). 
 175 See supra Part II.A (explaining that capital markets are transitioning from being 
national or regional in nature to being global). 
 176 See generally Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities 
Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 387 (2001) (arguing that regulatory 
competition is desirable over a uniform international regulatory scheme); Roberta 
Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 
2359 (1998) (arguing for “competitive federalism” as a system of securities regula-
tion). 
 177 See supra note 85 (suggesting that regulatory competition results in innovation 
because regulators must compete to attract market participants). 
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rages innovation that fuels market efficiency in the emerging global 
capital markets, the regulatory fragmentation that results adds trans-
action costs that likely offset any benefits of that innovation.
178
  
Second, arguments in favor of regulatory competition ignore that is-
suers serve as a check on over regulation because of the ability of 
corporations and other business entities to influence the political 
process.
179
  Therefore, the tensions that exist under a regulatory com-
petition model may not be necessary to create an optimal regulatory 
regime because issuers are able to create the necessary tension.  
Third, regulatory harmonization and centralization do not necessari-
ly prevent regulatory competition if the centralized regulator creates 
a floor from which regulators can choose to upwardly depart, if they 
desire.
180
  Fourth, as the Great Depression and Great Recession evi-
dence, regulatory competition and the patchwork of regulation that 
it generates produce a suboptimal level of regulation.
181
 
Another common argument against the harmonization and cen-
tralization of international securities law is that such an approach is 
impossible to implement.  This argument is usually founded on 
claims that securities regulators are unwilling to cede power
182
 and 
that the theories of securities regulation vary too greatly throughout 
the world to allow for harmonization and centralization.
183
 
 
 178 See supra notes 138–143 and accompanying text (discussing the added transac-
tion costs that are created by the current model of international securities law, which 
is based upon regulatory competition). 
 179 See Black, supra note 70, at 77 (“[W]e need never worry about over-regulation; 
business interests have many well-funded and effective lobbyists, including the securi-
ties and accounting industries, small business, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
to make sure that this does not happen.”). 
 180 See Jenah, supra note 30, at 77 (arguing that the “challenge [in international 
securities regulation] . . . is to strike the right balance between a healthy degree of 
regulatory competition and proverbial ‘race to the bottom.’”). 
 181 See supra notes 162–163 (arguing that the patchwork of regulation that existed 
in the United States prior to the stock market crash of 1929 and ensuing depression 
was ineffective in regulating the national capital markets in the United States); see 
also supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text (arguing that the financial downturn 
that began in 2008 resulted because the patchwork of national securities regulation 
that existed at the time was ineffective in regulating the emerging global capital mar-
kets). 
 182 See Pan, supra note 37, at 236 (“Foreign jurisdictions historically have expressed 
hostility to any extension of U.S. trading and liability standards to their markets, and 
the SEC has expressed skepticism about the standards of the most prominent foreign 
exchanges.”). 
 183 See Langevoort, supra note 47, at 204.  
[The system of securities regulation in the United States] has been 
built over the last seventy-five years largely to promote the interests of 
retail investors, and the political demand for regulatory responses after 
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Although a model of international securities law based on har-
monization and centralization is likely unrealistic in the short-term,
184
 
such an approach makes sense in the long-term.  In recent years, the 
world’s securities markets have transitioned from being national or 
regional in nature to being global.
185
  The implications of this transi-
tion are still being worked out, including issues of how to regulate the 
emerging global securities markets.  Arguing that the world has to re-
tain a system of securities regulation based on national or regional 
regulation ignores the fact that regulatory regimes ultimately can and 
should evolve in response to the subject matter that they regulate. 
In addition, financial crises fuel evolution in securities regula-
tion.
186
  As evidenced by the financial crisis that began in 2008, pat-
chwork regulation does not work to regulate the emerging global se-
curities markets.
187
  Even if the financial crisis does not fuel a leap 
toward harmonization and centralization, the crisis still created a 
push for greater coordination and cooperation among the world’s 
securities regulators.
188
  The development of harmonization and cen-
 
every financial scandal reminds us of this.  But globally, few if any other 
countries have a similarly retail-driven approach.  Both markets and 
regulation in the rest of the world have been built for institutional in-
vestors better able to fend for themselves, and have a lighter touch for 
that reason. 
Id.; see Madison & Greene, supra note 34, at 100 (“[A]s a result of both historical and 
cultural influences, other countries may still have differing standards for disclosure 
that are either less stringent or based on different assumptions than those found in 
the U.S. markets.  For example, some foreign markets may have different cultural or 
legal views towards insider trading.”); Pan, supra note 39, at 137 (“The U.S. regulato-
ry regime tightly controls how exchanges operate, who can conduct business on the 
exchanges and what are the responsibilities of exchanges to regulate market partici-
pants.  Unique to the U.S. system, these regulations cannot easily be extended to 
non-U.S. exchanges.”). 
 184 See supra note 120 (explaining that the creation of a centralized global securi-
ties regulator is likely impracticable in the short term). 
 185 See supra Part II.A (discussing the reasons that capital markets have transi-
tioned from being national or regional in nature to being global). 
 186 See DeLaMater, supra note 33, at 119 (“History has shown that we go through 
periods of boom followed by bust, with the bust followed by increased regulation . . . 
regulators are persuaded to accommodate various practices and the economy and 
capital markets enter another period of boom.  The cycle repeats.”); Tafara & Peter-
son, supra note 98, at 51 (“The history of financial legislation, from the Bubble Act of 
1720 to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, shows that it is usually the child of crisis.”). 
 187 See Langevoort, supra note 47, at 205 (arguing that the financial crisis that be-
gan in 2008 is a “dramatic example” of the consequences of the “absence of collec-
tive action” in international securities regulation). 
 188 See Karmel, supra note 37, at 1711 (“Current market turmoil caused by the sub-
prime mortgage crisis and other events is . . . a dynamic which leads to regulatory 
reform.  Open questions include what kind of reform will result from this collapse of 
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tralization in international securities law is likely going to have to be 
an evolutionary process that occurs over the course of decades 
through numerous successor entities with each having greater power 
until true harmonization and centralization is achieved.
189
  Even if 
harmonization and centralization is not feasible in the short-term, se-
curities regulators should still work toward it in the long-term be-
cause it affords the best solution to international securities law.
190
 
Lastly, some argue that a harmonization and centralization 
model would result in an unnecessary loss of autonomy for the Unit-
ed States.
191
  Obviously, this argument is commonly made by propo-
nents of the continued dominance of the United States as a securities 
regulator.  Such an argument, however, ignores the fact that the do-
minance of the United States is waning both in terms of its capital 
markets and its role as a securities regulator.
192
  Although the creation 
of a centralized global regulator would require that the United States 
cede some of its power, the United States has incentive to work quick-
ly toward the creation of a global securities regulator because if it 
works quickly, it can work from a position of power, rather than simp-
ly being another actor in the process.  The United States has to ac-
knowledge that the world is changing, and the best result for the 
United States would be for it to work toward a harmonized and cen-
tralized system of securities regulation in which it maintains a signifi-
cant or dominant role.  The United States has more to risk by waiting 
to act because its dominance continues to fade. 
 
confidence in the markets and whether the SEC or the EU will drive any reform 
agenda.”). 
 189 See Langevoort, supra note 47, at 205 (“Even in the face of crisis and scandal, 
we will not see a global securities and financial services regulator—something as 
dramatic as a Global Financial Services Commission—anytime soon.  But we may well 
see joint task forces wherein regulatory personnel from various countries are detailed 
to a central location to coordinate enforcement efforts aimed at some kind of threat, 
and if that becomes routine, there will be further small steps toward a permanent 
regulatory institution, until it already exists de facto and is less threatening political-
ly.”). 
 190 See supra Part III (explaining why a model based on harmonization and centra-
lization offers the best approach to international securities law). 
 191 See also Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It 
Doesn’t), GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1542829 (“The establishment 
of a global authority [in international securities regulation] would require countries 
to delegate authority to a supranational authority . . . . It is, however, unlikely that the 
legislatures of most countries would agree to such an infringement on their domestic 
powers of policymaking and governance, especially with regards to large domestic 
financial institutions and firms.”). 
 192 See supra notes 36–37 (explaining that the dominance of the United States con-
tinues to wane in terms of its capital markets and role as a securities regulator). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
As explained in the introduction of this Article, the United 
States government has recognized that patchwork regulation will not 
work effectively to regulate the emerging global securities markets.
193
  
Yet, despite the promise of a new foundation for financial supervision 
and regulation,
194
 the United States and the world’s other securities 
regulators have left in place the cracked and fragmented foundation 
that was in place prior to the financial crisis that began in 2008.
195
 
Ideally, the world should adopt the same approach that the 
United States adopted in the wake of the stock market crash of 1929 
and pursue a path of harmonization and centralization in interna-
tional securities law.
196
  Nations throughout the world should harmon-
ize their systems of securities regulation to allow for the existence of a 
centralized global securities regulator, and then, the nations should 
work together to bring into existence such a regulator.  The regulator 
should have robust monitoring, regulatory, and enforcement powers 
and should set a baseline of securities regulation from which nations 
could choose to upwardly depart, if they desire.  Such a model based 
on harmonization and centralization would have a variety of benefits, 
including helping to stabilize the emerging global securities mar-
ket,
197
 assisting market participants,
198
 and pooling the expertise and 
experience of the world’s securities regulators.
199
  Although such a 
 
 193 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (reporting that “financial stress can 
spread easily and quickly across national boundaries”). 
 194 See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 1 (describing the Obama Administra-
tion’s and the United States Department of Treasury’s promise to “build a new foun-
dation for financial regulation and supervision”). 
 195 See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text (explaining that the United 
States government does not appear to be concentrating on meaningful change to 
international securities regulation). 
 196 See supra notes 162–167 and accompanying text (describing the evolution of 
securities regulation in the United States and explaining that the United States 
adopted a harmonized and centralized system of federal securities regulation as a 
result of the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression). 
 197 See supra Part III.A (explaining that harmonization and centralization of inter-
national securities law helps to reduce systemic risk because it ends the race-to-the-
bottom that is occurring in international securities regulation, provides a seamless 
system of regulation that prevents regulatory and enforcement gaps, and reduces 
spillover risks from regional or national financial crises). 
 198 See supra Part III.B (arguing that harmonization and centralization of interna-
tional securities law will increase the efficiency of the emerging global capital mar-
kets by reducing transaction costs, removing barriers to efficiency, and increasing in-
vestor confidence). 
 199 See supra Part III.C (arguing that harmonization and centralization of interna-
tional securities law will be beneficial because it will pool the expertise and expe-
rience of the world’s securities regulators). 
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model does have some drawbacks, these drawbacks are far out-
weighed by the benefits that harmonization and centralization afford. 
200
 
A slow evolutionary process will be required to allow a harmo-
nized and centralized system of international securities regulation to 
emerge because nations remain unwilling to shed their nationalistic 
and protectionist tendencies relating to securities regulation.  With 
that said, global capital markets have emerged, and a model of inter-
national securities regulation based on harmonization and centraliza-
tion is the best mechanism to regulate it. 
 
 200 See supra Part IV (explaining and rebutting a variety of arguments against har-
monization and centralization, including that harmonization and centralization do 
not yield the same benefits as regulatory competition, cannot be implemented in the 
current international regulatory environment, and would result in a loss of autonomy 
for the United States). 
